U.S. security compromised by Iraq goals

Zachary Kaye Columnist

On Sept. 21, The New York Times disclosed the severity of the manpower strain under which the United States army is operating. The occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan require a constant rotation of tens of thousands of soldiers, and each unit requires proper rest, re-supply, and rehabilitation between deployments. The military relies on an increasingly large share of National Guard and Reserve units to fulfill commitments. As a result, the United States can now field only 7,000-10,000 soldiers in the event of an emergency.

The United States eliminated any chance of securing peace by choosing to invade Iraq with insufficient force, and our ability to respond to international crises with a strong force has been substantially compromised.

The rush to Baghdad was indeed a triumphant display of force—but it was a predictably ephemeral victory. Ultimately, American soldiers did not find a thankful nation, but a resentful insurgency.

United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld championing of a fast, light attack force, and his conviction that occupying soldiers would be welcomed as liberators, has resulted in more American deaths.

Iraq was invaded in 1991 by over 500,000 soldiers, in addition to a force of 100,000 Turkish soldiers acting as a deterrent in the North. The “Coalition of the Willing” that conducted the 2003 invasion consisted of less than 200,000 soldiers, and, unlike its predecessor, actually occupied the country. Exacerbating this critical deficiency, the United States disbanded the Iraqi Army only to begin rebuilding it some time later.

The invasion and occupation of a nation of millions is a daunting task. Success requires overwhelming force. Commanders have described combating the insurgency as “fire-fighting”—there are simply not enough soldiers to control the country, so we can only respond to situations as they arise, by restlessly moving troops from one city to the next. Of course, this necessitates the sacrifice of control of the previously occupied region, which is quickly taken advantage of by insurgents.

With more soldiers, Iraq could have been more comprehensively secured. Weapon caches could have been destroyed, insurgents rooted out in the beginning, and a sense of safety and security would have encouraged more Iraqis to trust the United States.

The conceit of the Bush administration ensured from day one that there would never be enough soldiers in Iraq. All of the high-tech air power, anti-missile systems, and spy satellites in the world mean nothing if there is not a sufficiently large force deployed on the ground. Iraq is the disaster that it is for many reasons, but the highly idealistic stance of the administration surely guaranteed failure. Now, the United States’ future security is compromised by the depletion of the army.